Notes for 11/5/2026
11/5/2026
[Philosophy Club every Wednesday, 5-6 pm, in the Buchtel College of Arts and Sciences room 436 ("The Cave")
Bioethics Club Tuesdays from 4:30-5:30 in CAS 436.]
If someone changes their personality after committing a crime, should they still be punished for it?
The traditional view of identity over time is that not all properties of a thing can be inessential (accidental) if it remains the same over time. There must be at least one essential property that is the invariant bearer of the thing’s identity over time.
In the case of personal identity, this has often been thought to be the soul.
But there have been several objections to this.
The first is skepticism about the existence of the soul.
If the soul exists, it doesn’t seem to be knowable (think about the argument against mathematical realism based on similar reasoning).
But a different line of argument comes from a thought experiment proposed by Leibniz:
Suppose your soul is reincarnated after your death and inhabits a completely new body. But suppose that when this happens, it is wiped clean of all memories or other traces of what we would call your personality. Would this person be the same person as you?
Since it is now generally accepted that the brain is responsible for memory and personality traits, the brain theory of identity has gained popularity.
Most people (not all) think that the brain is the only organ in your body that cannot be transplanted without destroying identity.
But if what makes the brain important is being the seat of memory and personality, then aren’t memory and personality what matters to personal identity and not the brain, itself?
(Compare identity-theory and functionalism)
Some functionalists believe that if memory and personality are functions of the brain, these functions could be transferred to a computer or a robot, and then YOU would be the computer or robot.
(“Digital afterlife” or “digital immortality”)
Digital duplication
Uniqueness requirement for personal identity: There can be only one of YOU.
Is the invariant bearer theory of personal identity true?
Is the uniqueness requirement true?
What account of personal identity can we propose instead?
John Locke
“Chain of stages theory of identity over time”
How is it possible for us to THINK of something as the same despite changing?
We THINK (apply the idea of identity to) identity when something changes gradually in respect of some characteristics while leaving the majority of characteristics unchanged.
Examples:
Artifacts (watches, ships, clocks)
Plants
Animals
Human bodies
Persons (emphasizes psychological traits)
Does Locke’s chain of stages account of personal identity work?
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