Notes for 11/3/2026

  

11/3/2026

 

[Philosophy Club every Wednesday, 5-6 pm, in the Buchtel College of Arts and Sciences room 436 ("The Cave")

Bioethics Club Tuesdays from 4:30-5:30 in CAS 436.]

 

Do you think it’s true or false that no two snowflakes are exactly alike?


 

The standard analysis of identity is given by Leibniz’s Law:

x = y if and only if x and y have all the same properties.

 

 For example, the quantity (1+1) is identical to 2

 

The usual way of testing Leibniz’s Law is to replace or substitute y for x and see if the truth value of the resulting statement changes.

 

For example,

I have 2 apples.

I have (1+1) apples.

 

Tomorrow is Wednesday.

The day after today is Wednesday.

 

 

There are a few problems using Leibniz’s Law as an answer  to “What exactly is identity?”

 

First, some kinds of properties seem to involve the way something is named or described.

 

Lois Lane knows that Clark Kent is Clark Kent.

Lois Lane does not know that Clark Kent is Superman.

Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly.

Lois Lane does not believe that Clark Kent can fly.

So, Superman has a property that Clark Kent does not have (being believed by Lois Lane to be able to fly).

So, Superman is not identical to Clark Kent.

 

There are various solutions to this kind of problem, but I’m not going to go over them here.

 

A much more significant problem for Leibniz’s Law is that it doesn’t work for things that change location or persist through time.

 

The ball that is thrown and the ball that is caught are (at least usually) the same ball.

But the ball has different spatial properties at the time it is thrown and at the time it is caught.

 

An easy fix is just to exclude spatial and temporal properties from Leibniz’s Law:

      x = y if and only if x and y have all the same non-spatial and non-temporal properties

 

 

But there are other ways things change properties, such as:

- being seated vs standing

- being owned by Bob vs being owned by me

- being single vs being married

 

The traditional way of dealing with such changes is to distinguish between essential and accidental (or inessential) properties, so that we rewrite Leibniz’s Law as follows:

x = y if and only if x and y have all the same essential properties

 

This fix works great if only we can figure out which properties are essential and which are not, and this turns out to be harder than one might think.

 

This is because it looks like:

A property is essential to something if and only if changing it doesn’t affect the identity of the thing.

 

Alternatively:

A property is essential to something if and only if changing it means the thing no longer exists.

 

It is useful to distinguish between “synchronic” identity (identity at a single time) and “diachronic” identity (identity at different times.

 

What is usually called “the problem of identity” in philosophy is really the problem of how diachronic identity is determined.

 

The problem can be summed up in the question, “How can something change and yet remain the same?”

 

The classic example of this problem is the Ship of Theseus thought experiment.

 

The heart of the Ship of Theseus problem is that lots of things don’t seem to have any essential properties.

 

 

Going back to Plato & Aristotle (and others):

We can distinguish between the FORM of a thing and the MATTER it is made from. (“Hylomorphism”)

But it seems things can change in respect of both their matter and their form without loss of identity.

 

 

What, exactly, makes something the same when it has changed?

 

 

This problem can be applied not only to things, but also to people (persons).

 

 

 

“I am not the man I was.”

 

The problem of personal identity.

 

Body?

Brain?

Personality?

Consciousness?

Soul?

 

What, if anything, is the bearer of your identity across changes?

 

 

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