Notes for 11/19/2026
11/19/226
Due to Thanksgiving Break, the Philosophy Club will not meet on Wednesday, 11/25/26. The final meeting of the semester will be December 2. There will be pizza.
Where do YOU get your values?
Plato’s Euthyphro dialog attacks authoritarian ethics
Piety = moral virtue/goodness
Aporia = confusion
Euthyphro’s definition of piety = “what is loved by the gods”
Euthyphro dilemma
Is something pious because the gods love it or do they love it because it is pious?
Divine Command Theory is an authoritarian ethic that grounds morality in the commands and prohibitions of God.
Actions are right because and only because God commands them, and wrong because and only because God forbids them.
Why does God command what he does? Are there moral/ethical reasons for what God commands/forbids?
On DCT, morality appears to consist only in obedience.
This makes reason irrelevant.
It also appears to make motives irrelevant.
Interpretation/source problem for authoritarian ethics
Silence problem
Disagreement problem
Can reason even be a source of moral knowledge?
Empiricism: David Hume
We have no innate knowledge, including innate knowledge of ethical truths.
Rather, all knowledge derives from experience.
But we don’t acquire knowledge of ethical truths from the senses.
Then how?
Hume’s answer is that judgments of right/wrong must be grounded in our FEELINGS.
This completely overturns Plato’s elevation of reason above feelings. For Hume, “Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions.”
(Roughly: Reason is a tool to help satisfy desires.)
The biggest problem for an empiricist account of ethics (“ethical empiricism”) is how to handle disagreements.
We generally assume that factual disagreements are resolvable (at least in principle) by evidence.
Someone who refuses to consider evidence objectively is generally considered irrational.
If ethics is a matter of feelings, is resolution of ethical disagreements even possible?
Can evidence be presented in favor of or against ethical claims?
Suppose you want to convince your friend, Martha, that she should marry George. But Martha isn’t attracted to George. Can you convince Martha to be attracted to George?
(Remember our discussion of voluntarism, earlier in this course?)
There may be SOME degree to which emotional voluntarism is possible, but there seem to be limits.
Or:
Suppose you want to convince Rowan that cilantro is delicious. Does this goal make sense?
If ethical judgments depend on feelings, isn’t it as impossible to convince someone to change their ethical views as it is to change their views about romantic attractions or food preferences?
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