Notes for 10/8/2026

  

10/8/2026

 

[Philosophy Club every Wednesday, 5-6 pm, in the Buchtel College of Arts and Sciences room 436 ("The Cave")

Bioethics Club Tuesdays from 4:30-5:30 in CAS 436.]

 

I am skeptical about ___.


 

Oops.

 

 

 

 

 

How skeptical should you be?

 

“Common sense realism” – reality is at least pretty much the way it seems to be.

 

 

 

 

What, exactly, does it mean to be skeptical?

 

 


 

Do you think the following two statements can be true at the same time?

(A)      I believe that x.

(B)      I am skeptical that x.

 

 

 

“Doxastic attitudes”

 

-      Belief

-      Disbelief

-      Suspension of judgment

 

Some think “knowledge” belongs here, as well.

 

What about “doubt”?

Is doubt the same as skepticism?

 

Here are three possibilities:

-      Being skeptical just means having some degree of doubt, but this is consistent with some degree of belief.

-      Being skeptical means having enough doubt to motivate either disbelief or suspension of judgment.

-      Being skeptical means having enough doubt to motivate some degree of disbelief.

 

 

 

Epistemic objectivism:

Whether or not there are good reasons for some belief is objective (note merely a matter of opinion).

 

 

Epistemic subjectivism:

Having good reasons is a matter of feeling (rather than fact).

 

 

 

The most common defenses of epistemic subjectivism are associated with the idea of intellectual liberty.

 

 

However: It is possible to distinguish the right to believe something from the rationality of believing it.


Epistemic objectivists hold that:

-      If a belief B is objectively better supported for someone than any alternative beliefs, then they should believe B.

-      If any alternative beliefs are objectively better supported for someone than belief B, then they should disbelieve B.

-      If no available beliefs are objectively better supported for someone, then they should suspend judgment.

 

 

 

Even if one adopts an infallibilist account of knowledge, no one thinks infallibility is a necessary requirement for rational belief.

 

 

Rationality is to some degree relative:

Specifically, whether or not a belief is rational for someone depends on the information available to them.

 

 

Do you think people are responsible for not finding information to support their beliefs?

 

 

 

Are people responsible for not looking for information against what they already believe?

 

 

 

Are people responsible for knowing how to find reliable information that bears on their beliefs?

 

 

 

Rationality and critical thinking can be explained in terms of beliefs.

 

 

CT = examining the reasons for one’s beliefs and evaluating (a) the quality of reasons for them, and (b) the rules connecting those reasons to the beliefs.

 

 

Most of our beliefs are based on either perception or testimony.

 

 

Examinations of skepticism in philosophy usually focus on perceptual beliefs.

This is surprising since testimony is known to be less reliable than perception.

 

 

Many current disagreements in society result from differences in testimonial sources of information.

 

 

What is a reliable source of testimonial evidence?

 

This is a harder question to answer in detail than one might think.

 

 

The simple answer is that a source is reliable to the degree that it provides information that results in true beliefs.

But now, of course, the focus shifts to the determination of this.

 

 

At some point, one needs to stop with what is at least provisionally accepted as truth.

 

 

Credentials and reputation can help even though they are not guarantees.

 

 

 

Fallibilist rationality is probabilistic.

But the probabilities here are obviously not usually precise.

 

 

It also seems we should accept that belief comes in degrees, and that one’s degree of belief should match the degree of support there is for the belief.

(“A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence.” – David Hume)

 

 

 

Details are still hard to clarify.

First, what, exactly, is a belief?

 

 

The distinction above between the 3 doxastic attitudes (belief, disbelief, & suspension of judgment) suggests that these are attitudes one takes toward claims (or statements or propositions or assertions).

 

The logic of claims is that they always exactly one truth value which is either TRUE or FALSE (if you’ve done any computer coding, you may recognize these as “Boolean values” from the logician/mathematician/philosopher George Boole.)

 

 

But are claims linguistic? (Are they the same as sentences or utterances?)

The usual view is that they are not:

A claim is something a sentence can express (what the sentence says).

This is because it seems different sentences can express the same claim:

 

Today is Thursday.

The current day of the week is Thursday.

今日は木曜日です.

 

 

And the same sentence can express different claims (for example, when said by different people):

 

I am really tall.

 

 

This raises the question of what, exactly, claims are if they differ from the sentences that express them.

 

 

There is also the question of what, exactly, it is for a claim to be true or false.

 

 

The most common view of truth today is the correspondence theory of truth:

 

      P is true if and only if P corresponds to the facts.

 

That is, truth is a correspondence between a claim and the way things are.

 

This suggests that claims (and so beliefs) are a type of representation.

(Not everyone accepts this.)

 

Rationality consists in adjusting one’s representations of things on the basis of available information in an effort to make those representations map onto reality.

 

 

Why should we care about all this?

This is the problem not of truth values, but rather of the value of truth.

 

 

Is truth valuable for its own sake (does it have intrinsic value) or is it only valuable for its effects (does it have only extrinsic value)?

 

At least everyone can agree that truth has pragmatic value, because beliefs are action-guiding.

This is at least one reason why we care about beliefs being true, whether they are ours or those held by others.

 

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