Notes for 10/29/2026

  

10/29/2026

[Philosophy Club every Wednesday, 5-6 pm, in the Buchtel College of Arts and Sciences room 436 ("The Cave")

Bioethics Club Tuesdays from 4:30-5:30 in CAS 436.]

 

Do you believe in ghosts?


 

What, exactly, is a ghost?

 

 

How is it possible for ghosts to be seen?

Heard?

Detected via “ghost detectors”?

 

Ectoplasm

 

 

Souls?

Soul = mind = spirit (Descartes)

 

Ersatz body (ectoplasm view)

 

 

Why do ghosts have clothes?

Ghost ships?

Ghost trains?

 

 

Ghosts = psychic traces left by people especially who have experienced trauma

 

What’s the physics of this?

 

 

Are ghosts persons?

 

Do they have free will?

Are they rational?

Are ghosts conscious?

Do they sleep?

How conscious are they?

 

 

 

 

 

Zombies

 

Philosophical zombies

A being who is externally identical to a conscious person but internally empty of conscious experience

 

(“The Problem of Other Minds”)

 

 

 


 

David Chalmers’ Zombie argument:

(Suppose someone created an EXACT physical duplicate of you. At the atomic level.)

 

1. You and your duplicate are exactly alike in respect of physical properties.

2. But you and your duplicate might not be alike in respect of consciousness (you are conscious – your duplicate is a P-zombie).

3. Therefore, consciousness is not a physical property.

 

 

Philosophical zombies are conceivable.

If philosophical zombies are conceivable, then they are possible.

Therefore, p-zombies are possible.

If p-zombies are possible, then consciousness cannot be explained in physicalist terms.

Therefore, consciousness cannot be explained in physicalist terms (physicalism is false).

 

“The Hard Problem of Consciousness” (bridging the gap between physical explanation and doing justice to the experience we have of consciousness)

 

Are p-zombies really conceivable?

 

Conceivability is a guide to possibility.

(If you can conceive it, then it is possible.)

 

Suppose I create an exact atom-atom duplicate of your car.

I can conceive that your original car runs, but your duplicate car won’t.

 

Can you really conceive that all physical requisites for something are met, but the thing in question is still lacking?

 

 

 

 

 

Chalmers’ argument depends on the Conceivability Principle:

      Whatever is conceivable without contradiction is possible.

 

(P-zombies are conceivable, so they are possible.)

 

 

 

(Types of possibility)

Logical (possible given certain definitions/concepts/meanings)

 

Physical (possible given the laws of physics)

 

Real (possible given how we think the world normally works)

 

Metaphysical possibility (possible given what reasonably can be thought to be real)

 

Epistemic (possible as far as we reasonably believe)

 

 

 

Is the conceivability principle true?

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