Notes for 10/22/2026

  

10/22/2026

 

[Philosophy Club every Wednesday, 5-6 pm, in the Buchtel College of Arts and Sciences room 436 ("The Cave")

Bioethics Club Tuesdays from 4:30-5:30 in CAS 436.]

 

What score would you give yourself on the following test?

Aphantasia: Causes, Symptoms, and Diagnosis


 

Main theories of mind:

-      Dualism

-      Identity theory

-      Functionalism

 

Both identity theory and functionalism are physicalist – they only accept physical things/substances (naturalism)

 

Thought/cognition only involves the brain or a comparable information processing system

 

Brain & behavioral sciences and philosophy of mind tend to accept physicalism

 

 


 

Representational theory of mind/cognition.

Thinking consists of “inner” mental objects (ideas) by means of which we represent what is “outer” (things in the world).

 

 

 

After Newton, science becomes primarily about observation and measurement.

Can there be a SCIENCE of Psychology? (Some have thought not)

 

The mind appears to be unobservable as an object of scientific study.

 

One approach is to rely entirely on self-reports.

For example:

 

 

How could I possibly verify your experience?

 

There are often good reasons to reject self-reports.

(This can be important in opinion research, for example. What people SAY they think isn’t always what they really think.)

 

Here is an example. If you think you are a 1 or a 2 on the above aphantasia test, picture a pine tree.

 

 

 

 

Now, count the number of branches on the tree.

Could you count the needles?

Is there anything behind the tree?

Is the tree in dirt? Grass? Does it have roots?

What kind of light is illuminating the tree? Are any of the branches in shadow?

 

These questions suggest that picturing a tree is different from looking at one, because the mental image is constructed, and the construction process is updated when trying to answer the questions.

What, exactly, is a mental image?

 

 

What, exactly, is an idea?

 

 

The “inner world” model of psychology is complicated by the hypothesis that some thoughts are unconscious. This raises serious questions about verification.

 

 

 

Behaviorism in psychology: We can’t know the inner contents of minds.

We can’t observe thoughts, intentions, beliefs, or feelings.

We can only know what we can observe: behavior. (Mind as “black box”) Stimulus & response are the only proper variables for a science of psychology.

 

Behaviorism in philosophy: We can’t know minds directly. We can only know inputs and outputs. But ALSO: If we can’t empirically confirm a statement, it is meaningless (logical positivism). So, terms like “mind” turn out to be meaningless.

 

 

Behaviorism in psychology banishes the mind as a proper object of study. Behaviorism in philosophy banishes the mind as something that exists altogether (mind JUST IS behavior and dispositions to behavior).

 

 

A descendent of philosophical behaviorism is “eliminative materialism” which seeks to REPLACE all “mind talk” with neuro-behaviorist talk. (There really are no beliefs, just as there really are no sunsets.
Early AI holds that to think is to give the “right” sorts of outputs in response to the “right” sorts of inputs.

 

If the mind is not observable, then what criteria determine whether or not someone or something is thinking?

 

Behaviorist approaches say it can only be behavior. If something acts like it is thinking, we have to say that it is.

 

Of course, “acts like” must be construed broadly.

 

 

Turing Test: If a computer gives the same kinds of outputs in response to inputs as a human being, then the same reasons I say the human is intelligent should make me concede that the computer is intelligent.

 

Multiple realizability (the same function can be performed by different things – sometimes radically different)

 

 

Input-output (or “black box”) functionalism (standard view in traditional AI):

To be intelligent is to give the “right kinds” of outputs in response to the right kinds of inputs.

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