Notes for 10/15/2026

  

10/15/2026

 

[Philosophy Club every Wednesday, 5-6 pm, in the Buchtel College of Arts and Sciences room 436 ("The Cave")

Bioethics Club Tuesdays from 4:30-5:30 in CAS 436.]

 

Is a pair of scissors one thing or two?

Suppose we accept that inductive inference is reliable (as it seems we should).

 

That is, we can, in good conscience, accept that:

      The future will continue to resemble the past.

 

 

Nelson Goodman suggests that we still have a problem because we still need to know what, exactly, it means for the future to resemble the past.

 

 

Imagine that one day space aliens land on Earth in search of emeralds.

A person in a alien garment

Description automatically generated

 

Because emeralds have the most beautiful color – “grue”.

 

In the alien language, “grue” means “green if observed before 1/1/2027 and blue thereafter.”

 

They also like sapphires, because sapphires are “bleen” – blue if observed prior to 1/1/2027 and green thereafter.

 

 

As an Earthling, you believe that all emeralds are green, and all sapphires are blue.

 

The alien believes that all emeralds are grue and all sapphires are bleen.

 

But (since 1/1/2027 isn’t here yet) you and the alien have exactly the same inductive evidence for the claims:

(A) All emeralds are green.

(B) All emeralds are grue.

 

 

You say, “All the emeralds I’ve observed in the past have been green, so inductive reasoning tells me that all the emeralds I observe in the future (including after 1/1/2027) will also be green.”

 

The alien says, “All the emeralds I’ve observed in the past have been grue, so inductive reasoning tells me that all the emeralds I observe in the future (including after 1/1/2027) will also be grue.”

 

You say, “But that’s crazy, because if an emerald is grue, it will change color from green to blue on 1/1/2027.”

 

The alien responds, “No, you’re the one who is crazy, because if an emerald is green, it will change color from grue to bleen on 1/1/2027.”

 

 

Goodman’s point is that the rule “the future will resemble the past” doesn’t help unless we can answer the question of what, exactly, it means for the future to resemble the past.

 

 

If all emeralds really are grue, then if emeralds all change from green to blue on 1/1/2027, then the future will turn out to have resembled the past in respect of grue -ness, but if they don’t change from green to blue on 1/1/2027, then the future will turn out to have resembled the past in respect of green -ness.

 

We DEFINE “grue” in terms of a change.

Aliens define “green” in terms of a change.

 

 

Whether the future resembles the past or not is not just a function of inductive reasoning, but also of the concepts we apply to things in the first place.

 

We think the concepts we use are “correct” and the concepts the alien uses are “weird.” But what determines that this is true?

 

 

Consider “water”.

 


 

Isn’t it true that water is liquid if encountered between 0 and 100 degrees Celsius, solid if encountered below 0 degrees C, and gaseous if encountered above 100C?

 

(Or “water if encountered above 0C and ice if below.”)

 

Is this all that different from “grue”?

Most people think the grue problem is just an intellectual curiosity. But it actually has important and far-reaching implications because it forces us to ask whether our concepts are the only or right ones.

How do we know whether our current concepts are the best model for reality?

 

 

What is a correct description of something?

What is the correct way to distinguish things from one another? (What, exactly, is a THING?)

What criteria can/should we use to describe conditions?

 

 

Consider the concept of an “inthisroomthing”: Something is an inthisroomthing if and only if it is in this room.

 

 

(Write and share: Make up your own weird concept.)

 

Weird concepts can be useful, especially when representing specific situations, relationships, or restrictions. (This is largely the subject-matter of an area of philosophy called “applied ontology”.)

Two key parts of scientific methodology are confirmation and disconfirmation (falsification).

 

Carl Hempel’s “Paradox of the ravens” (not really a paradox)

 

Suppose we have an aviary with 5 ravens and 5 blue jays. We want to test the hypothesis “All ravens in this aviary are black.”

 

We can go about this in 2 ways:

(1) We can examine each of the ravens to see if any of them are a color other than black.

(2) We can examine all the birds that aren’t black to see if any of them are ravens.

 

In each case, we will examine the same number of birds (= 5).

 

But we can still use the same two methods even if we have a lot more birds, or even if we examine things that aren’t birds.

This is because following two statements are logically equivalent:

 

(A) All ravens are black.

(B) All non-black things are non-ravens.

 

(Even though B is a weird way to say things.)

 

So, suppose I find one non-black thing that is a raven: This would disconfirm both A and B. (What disconfirms one, disconfirms the other, since they are logically equivalent.)

 

 

Similarly, every time I find a black raven, this confirms A. It also confirms B.

 

But this implies that any non-black thing that isn’t a raven also confirms B, and so it also confirms A.

 

But this is weird.

 

The fact that this screen is white (it’s not a raven and it isn’t black) confirms the claim that all ravens are black (just to a really really REALLY small degree).

 

 

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