Notes for 10/13/2026

  

10/13/2026

 

[Philosophy Club every Wednesday, 5-6 pm, in the Buchtel College of Arts and Sciences room 436 ("The Cave")

Bioethics Club Tuesdays from 4:30-5:30 in CAS 436.]

 

Do you think hope is irrational?

 

 

Fallacy of motivated reasoning.


 

Last week we looked at David Hume’s analysis of causal necessity in which he appears to take the view that there is no GENUINE necessity in causal judgments.

 

Rather, the sense of necessity we attribute to causation is really an artifact of our minds forming habits of association between causes and effects.

 

If causal necessity is only psychological, then this seems to imply that causal beliefs are somehow not RATIONAL.

(This poses an obvious threat to science. (Major motivation for later philosophy (in particular, Immanuel Kant).))

 

 

Causal realism: Cause-effect relationships are really OUT THERE in the world.

 

Causal anti-realism (or causal skepticism): Cause-effect relationships are merely artifacts of our minds.

 

 

Can you think of a case where someone believes in a causal connection that you don’t believe in (pseudoscience, superstition, etc.)?

 

Do you think they are irrational? Why or why not?

 

 

Correlation is not causation

 

Post hoc ergo propter hoc.

(After this therefore because of this.)

 

 

 

 

 


 

A possible response to the apparent skepticism of Hume’s analysis of causation is to hold that causal beliefs are not DEDUCTIVELY rational, but they are INDUCTIVELY rational.

 

Deductive reasoning depends on logical structures that are defined in certain ways.

 

Consider the argument:

1. Either Wilma or Betty is the winner.

2. Wilma is not the winner.

3. Therefore, Betty is the winner.

 

If we ask how we know that deductive reasoning is reliable, the answer is that once we understand how deductive reasoning works, we understand that it HAS TO work.

 


 

Inductive reasoning is different, though.

Consider the argument:

1. All the ravens I’ve ever seen are black.

2. Therefore, all ravens are black.

 

The general form of this argument is:

1. All the x I’ve ever seen are y.

2. Therefore, all x are y.

 

Clearly, the form of this argument doesn’t make it so that “all x are y” has to be true.

 

It’s the nature of inductive reasoning that it is fallible. (Another point in favor of fallibilism.)

 

 

But the question remains as to why inductive reasoning is ever any good to begin with.

 

At the heart of inductive reasoning is this claim:

 

      The future will resemble the past.

 

Is this necessarily true? No.

 

So, it is only known by experience. How do we know it?

 

Answer: Because in the past, the future has turned out to resemble the past.

 

 

To put it another way:

 

There is no deductive argument that inductive reasoning is reliable.

 

The argument for the reliability of inductive reasoning relies on inductive reasoning. Which is circular reasoning.

The problem Hume identifies here has been called The Problem of (the justification of) Induction.

 

In brief: Inductive reasoning cannot be deductively justified and can’t be inductively justified without presupposing that inductive reasoning is justified.

 

Do you still trust inductive reasoning? If so, why?


 

(Exercise: write and discuss)

 


 

Is circular reasoning bad?

(For purposes of explanation, yes. “X because X” doesn’t really explain anything.)

 

The problem of induction is puzzling, but not necessarily all that worrisome.

 

There are other cases where one needs/uses X in order to do X.

Here are two examples from computer science:

 

Self-hosting: It is possible for compilers or interpreters to be written in the same language they compile or interpret (for example, an implementation of Python can be written in Python).

 

Recursive functions: Some functions can call themselves as part of their procedure.

 

 

Example:

def factorial(n):

if n == 0 or n == 1:

return 1

else: return n * factorial(n - 1)

 

Another example is that it is impossible to give a definition of ‘language’ that isn’t given in language.

 

 

Another possibility:

Distinguish rational from pragmatic justification.

(It works, whether it’s rational or not.)

 

 

But doesn’t pragmatic justification presuppose inductive reasoning?

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