Notes for 9/17/2026

  

9/17/2026

What is something you don’t believe, even though you agree that it is possible?

 

[Philosophy Club every Wednesday, 5-6 pm, in the Buchtel College of Arts and Sciences room 436 ("The Cave")

Bioethics Club Tuesdays from 4:30-5:30 in CAS 436.]

 

The concept of moral negligence is that moral responsibility attaches not only to actions (what we do), but also to omissions (what we fail to do or allow to happen).

 

 

 

The basic claim behind the Evidential Argument from Evil (EAE) is this:

 

An omnipotent, wholly good being will prevent any instance of evil (or suffering) that it can unless doing so would thereby either allow an equal or worse evil or prevent a greater good

(otherwise, it would be morally negligent).

 

To put it another way:

If an omnipotent wholly good being exists, then the only evils that exist are ultimately justified.

 

 

To say that an evil is ultimately justified is to say that when all considerations are taken into account, it is better (or just as good) that the evil be permitted than prevented.

 

My version of EAE:

 

1.   If God exists, then every evil is ultimately justified.

2.   It is implausible that every evil is ultimately justified (although, it is logically possible that every evil is ultimately justified).

3.   Therefore, it is implausible that God exists.

 

Plausibility differs from possibility. Mere possibility is not enough for a rational justification or explanation of behavior.

 

 

This argument is inductive rather than deductive.

 

Unlike deductive arguments, inductive arguments are capable of having all true premises but a false conclusion. (To show this is to give additional considerations that defeat the argument. Deductive arguments cannot be defeated.)

 

 

99/100 marbles from this jar are red.

Therefore, the last marble is red.

 

In order to defeat an inductive argument, you need independent additional information that changes the probability assessment.

 

What could defeat the EAE?

 

Why is it supposed to be implausible that every evil is ultimately justified?

 

 

Primarily, the reason is that we can’t think of any plausible justifications for a lot of the evils we observe. Many of the justifications we CAN think of are implausible.

 

Suppose you know that Snidely is planning to murder Nell. You have the ability to prevent this.

 

What could justify you in allowing the murder?

A lot of possibilities are implausible:

 

“I didn’t want to interfere with Snidely’s free will.”

 

“Maybe by killing Nell, Snidely prevented even worse things from happening?”

 

“Nell deserved death for things she did in the past (or in a past life).”

 

Possible useful distinction:

Prima facie judgment = what initially appears to be the case.

Ultima facie judgment = what really is the case.

 

Many evils are prima facie unjustified.

The EAE says that the mere possibility of these being ultima facie justified is not enough to defeat the prima facie judgment that they are unjustified.

 

The most influential response to the EAE is called “skeptical theism”.

 

The basic idea behind skeptical theism is that our moral competence is so vastly inferior to God’s that we should have no confidence in inferring a lack of ultimate justification from our inability to conceive any.

 

99 marbles from this jar have been red.

Therefore, the next marble is red.

 

 

 

Often, skeptical theists use analogies such as comparing the competence of children to adults or novices to experts.

Examples:

-      Childhood vaccination

-      Chess blunder

 

The problem with these examples is that they involve comparisons of KNOWN competences (we know that the parent or the chess master exists and can explain how and why their competence is superior).

 

 

The EAE is actually an instance of an argument from defeated expectations:

1.          If God exists, then we would not expect to find evils for which we can conceive no justification.

2.          We do find such evils.

3.          Therefore, probably, God does not exist.

 

ST rejects the first premise. We cannot use our limited perspective to tell us what we should expect if an unlimited God exists.

 

Problem for ST:

Does ST make God so far beyond human comprehension that we can no longer make any judgments at all about him?

Can we even distinguish between the concept of a good God and an evil God?