Notes for 9/15/2026

9/15/2026

If you could change one thing about the world, what would it be?

 

Argument from Evil

 

Logical Argument from Evil – It is logically impossible that both God and evil exist

 

Traditional attributes of God (despite being beyond understanding):

Omnipotent = all-powerful

Omniscient = all-knowing

Omnibenevolent = all-good

 

 

“Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?” (Epicurus)

 

 

A being B is omnipotent =df. If B wills some logically possible state of affairs S, then S obtains.

 

Stone paradox: Can God create a stone too heavy for him to lift?

Suicide paradox: Could God commit suicide?

 

 

 

 

LAE:

1.          If God exists, God is omnipotent and omnibenevolent.

2.          If God is omnibenevolent, then he wills a world without evil.

3.          If God is omnipotent, then if he wills some logically possible state of affairs S, then S obtains.

4.          A world without evil is logically possible.

5.          Evil exists in the world. (A world without evil does not obtain.)

6.          Therefore, God does not exist.

 

“Free Will Defense” (FWD)

 

Most people know that free will is often invoked to counter the argument from evil.

But it isn’t immediately clear HOW free will helps.

LAE (above) is logically valid (structurally good). This means to reject the conclusion, at least one premise must be rejected as false (or at least doubtful). But which premise?

Strongest versions of FWD depend on a revised concept of omnipotence.

 

Omnipotence: A being B is omnipotent if and only if for any logically possible state of affairs S that does not depend on the free will of some creature, if B wills S then S obtains.

 

Free will good = a good that results from the exercise of someone’s free will.

 

It’s better if I do a good thing of my own free will than if I am compelled to do it.

 

A world in which a significant number of free will goods exists is better than a world in which only compelled goods exist.

 

It is at least logically possible that the current world which contains both free will goods and free will evils is better than any world God could have created in which only compelled goods exist.

 

The world is partly made by God, but also partly by creatures with free will. To have free will is to be given the individual power to act contrary to God’s will.

 

It is generally conceded in philosophy of religion that the LAE is unsuccessful.

 

If there is even one POSSIBLE scenario under which both God and evil coexist, the LAE fails. 

 

[So, note that whether or not the LAE works depends crucially on how, exactly, ‘omnipotence’, ‘God’, and ‘free will’ are defined.]

 

 

A well-known response to the FWD is to distinguish between:

A.         Evils that are the result of creaturely free will (“moral evils”)

B.         Evils that are the result of natural forces (“natural evils”)

 

 

A revised version of LAE, therefore, can be constructed as follows:

1.          If God exists, God is omnipotent and omnibenevolent.

2.          If God is omnibenevolent, then he wills a world with as few evils as are necessary to result in the best world he can get.

3.          If God is omnipotent, then if he wills some logically possible state of affairs S that does not depend on the free will of some creature, then S obtains.

4.          A world without natural evils (evils that do not depend on the free will of some creature) is logically possible.

5.          Natural evils exist in the world.

6.          Therefore, God does not exist.

 

 

 

 

To resist this version of LAE, theists generally reject premise 2, holding that for all we know, perhaps some natural evils are a necessary prerequisite for ‘meaningful exercise’ of free will (roughly: you can’t really choose freely between A and B unless you know that B is an option).

 

 

 

J.L. Mackie suggests that the revised definition of omnipotence is incoherent.

 

This is because Mackie thinks that the following is true:

If there is any state of that a being B cannot control, then B cannot be omnipotent.

(You can’t be all-powerful if there is something beyond your power.)

 

The revised definition of omnipotence asserts that states of affairs that result from creaturely free-will are beyond God’s power.

(Can God create creatures he can’t control?)

 

This is like the stone paradox (Can God create a stone too heavy for him to lift?)

 

The solution to the stone paradox is to reject the described object as a logical impossibility (nothing can exist that is both unliftable by an omnipotent being and creatable by an omnipotent being).

 

Parity of reasoning suggests the same is true of the “control paradox” (nothing can exist that is both uncontrollable by an omnipotent being and creatable by an omnipotent being).

 

The usual reply to Mackie is that there is a difference between uncontrollable and being uncontrolled.

(God can control creatures with free will, but in doing so their free will would be cancelled. (If I let you do something by yourself, that doesn’t mean I couldn’t help you.))

 

But this creates a new difficulty:

Is it always better to let creatures with free will bring about evil than it would be to prevent them?