NOtes for 2/4/2026
2/4/2026
[Philosophy Club every Monday, 4-5 pm, in the Buchtel College of Arts and Sciences room 436 ("The Cave")]
[Challenge for today: Try to think of (and possibly ask) at least one question.]
Do you think all the suffering that exists in the world is deserved?
Strongest versions of Free Will Defense depend on a revised concept of omnipotence.
Omnipotence: A being B is omnipotent if and only if for any logically possible state of affairs S that does not depend on the free will of some creature, if B wills S then S exists.
Free will good = a good that results from the exercise of someone’s free will.
It’s better if I do a good thing of my own free will than if I am compelled to do it.
A world in which a significant number of free will goods exists is better than a world in which only compelled goods exist.
It is at least logically possible that the current world which contains both free will goods and free will evils is better than any world God could have created in which only compelled goods exist.
The world is partly made by God, but also partly by creatures with free will. To have free will is to be given the individual power to act contrary to God’s will.
It is generally conceded in philosophy of religion that the LAE is unsuccessful.
If there is even one POSSIBLE scenario under which both God and evil coexist, the LAE is flawed.
The concept of moral negligence is that moral responsibility attaches not only to actions (what we do), but also to omissions (what we fail to do or allow to happen).
The basic claim behind the Evidential Argument from Evil (EAE) is this:
An omnipotent, wholly good being will prevent any instance of evil (or suffering) that it can unless doing so would thereby either allow an equal or worse evil or prevent a greater good
(otherwise it would be morally negligent).
To put it another way:
If an omnipotent wholly good being exists, then the only evils that exist are ultimately justified.
To say that an evil is ultimately justified is to say that when all considerations are taken into account, it is better (or just as good) that the evil be permitted than prevented.
My version of EAE:
1. If God exists, then every evil is ultimately justified.
2. It is implausible that every evil is ultimately justified (although, it is logically possible that every evil is ultimately justified).
3. Therefore, it is implausible that God exists.
Plausibility differs from possibility. Mere possibility is not enough for a rational justification or explanation of behavior.
This argument is inductive rather than deductive.
Unlike deductive arguments, inductive arguments are capable of having all true premises but a false conclusion. (To show this is to give additional considerations that defeat the argument. Deductive arguments cannot be defeated.)
What could defeat the EAE?
Why is it supposed to be implausible that every evil is ultimately justified?
Comments
Post a Comment